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Medical errors are substantial causes of hospital-related
morbidity and mortality. It is estimated that preventable
medical errors alone cause up to 98,000 annual deaths in the
United States—the daily equivalent of one fatal jumbo jet
crash [8]. Preventable adverse events and accidents impose a
great burden on patients and on the health care system [5].
The finding that medical care in itself may generate harm—
sometimes fatal and sometimes persistent—has caused real
shockwaves of worrying. The society is not likely to tolerate
major accidents in a technologically high standing and
expensive activity that is mastered by highly trained
professionals and that is intended to heal and not to harm
[1]. The adagium primum non nocere (first, do not harm) is
one of the principal ethical precepts taught in medical
school. However, both unpretentiousness as well as righteous
realism point out that in medicine, like in any professional
activity, adverse events and accidents may be part of daily
practice. Ignoring the fact that also in medicine, Errare
humanum est (to err is human) or remaining indifferent to
its relevance is nothing less than a sign of dramatic
irresponsibility.
Children may be particularly at risk for medical harm.
Dependency, limited communication skills, immature anatomy
andphysiology,theneedforage-orweight-adaptedequipment,
and the need for dosing calculations have all been suggested as
potential risk factors [7]. In technically complex health care
systems, children’s vulnerability may still be more pro-
nounced. In this issue, Niesse et al. report their analysis of
critical incidents (CI) in severely ill children admitted to a
Paediatric Intensive Care Unit (PICU) [6]. Prospectively
collected (near) incidents were compared to retrospectively
assessed patient data. By use of logistic regression analysis,
mechanical ventilation, male gender, and length of stay were
identified as significant predictors for the occurrence of (near)
incidents. In theory, these finding are interesting, but their
practical value remains limited. At first, the three independent
predictors that were characterized can hardly be regarded as
potential targets for improvement strategies. None of them can
effectively be changed or avoided, except by a policy that
prevents PICU admissions in general or intubations and
invasive ventilation in particular. Recent advances in high-
flow oxygen therapy and non-invasive ventilation may
partially help to prevent the latter, although these techniques
will certainly be associated with their own risk profile.
Second, there is no doubt that within a population of sick
children, some will be more prone to CIs than others.
Recognizing this difference may help in the triage of pediatric
patients to the safest possible care. However, since any PICU
patient is subject to complex medical care involving many
professionals and technical interventions, they all must be
considered as being de facto at risk for CIs. This makes it less
interesting to identify more precisely those patients who have
higher risks, unless one was able to divide the PICU
population in, respectively, “no risk at all” and “at risk”
subgroups. Since all PICU patients are at risk and individual
risk profile may change over time, a CI preventive strategy
should be applied to the total population and at all times.
Niesse et al. nicely illustrate the traditional “sharp-end”
approach to medical errors by attributing them to directly
observablefactorsonthespotoftheactualaccident.Although
this may work for simple, straightforward systems, it will be
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systems like medicine. Causes of errors can be situated in
individual patients and individual professionals but just as
much in factors that are more distant or even unobservablyfar
from the actual working context. Examples of these “blunt
end”-situated factors are working conditions (e.g., availability
and content of protocols, workload, fatigue due to excessive
working hours, professional relations, communication, work
atmosphere, importance of hierarchy, reluctance or resistance
to report malpractice, etc.), the local policy (e.g., choices of
material, lack of appropriate tools, and retrenchments in
expenditure), and even legislation. In complex systems, also a
“blunt-end” approach is needed in order to reveal the
underlying system defect that allowed the opportunity for
the error to occur.
A corner stone of quality improvement and error reduction
in a “blunt-end” approach is the availability of a continuous
and easily accessible tool for error reporting. Niesse et al.
nicely illustrate the usefulness of a blame-free CI-reporting
system in identifying incidence and characteristics of com-
mon CIs. Provider-reported data may have important eye-
opening and problem-elucidating effects by offering the
opportunities to understand factors that contribute to or
prevent harm to patients. Error reporting may lead to the
creation of customized interventions that effectively reduce
the incidence of errors [2]. In order to make error reporting
profitable, some essential preconditions should be fulfilled.
First, the reporting system should apply a low threshold.
This means that also near incidents and minor incidents must
be reported. Based on experience in high technological
industries (e.g., oil industry and civil aviation), it is now
widely accepted that it makes more sense to screen system-
atically for (the much more common) near incidents than to
focus only on the analysis of obvious severe accidents. It has
been shown that most preventive system changes come from
minor incidents that occurred repeatedly over long periods
[4]. In my own experience, handling a low threshold also
helps professionals to gain experience in dealing with
adverse events. This may create an open-debate culture in
which reporting (near) incidents becomes an evident part of
daily practice.
Second, error reporting should be blame-free. Tradition-
ally, errors are “sharp-end-wise” attributed to individual
mistakes, and blamed professionals may be subject to
penalization. However, true negligence or guilty neglect is
only rarely the major cause of a medical error. Errors need
to be considered as system-based phenomena, which are—
de facto—impossible to eradicate completely. In order to
make the complex medical system safer, it is therefore
essential to uncover in time any defects that may lead to
major accidents within the foreseeable future. A system that
permits admitting errors honestly is more likely to achieve
this goal, compared to a punitive approach [3]. Reporting
errors should be encouraged as a sign of professionalism
and responsibility. Blame-free reporting does not mean that
professionals are released from the duty to deliver excellent
medical care at all times. Neither should it be considered as
an excuse for neglect or negligence.
Third, error reporting should be applied to all levels and
professions involved in the patient care and in all possible
directions. The most junior team member must be able to
correct a senior consultant or to report errors that have been
made by superiors, without running the risk of retaliation.
This will often require proper teamwork and flattening of
existing hierarchies.
Finally, error reporting cannot be an isolated activity.
Reported errors must be discussed within a multidisciplinary
surveillance group that analyzes the reported (near) incidents,
identifies critical situations or processes, implements initia-
tives for improvement, gives systematic feedback tothe front-
line professional, and continuously generates incentives for
effective reporting by professionals. In addition, health care
authorities, both institutional as well as political, must be
prepared to accept the consequences of a system-based
approach of dealing with medical errors. The failure to
improve blunt end-situated causes of medical errors will
cause frustration amongst health care workers in the short
term and certainly to patient harm in the long term.
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